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Elite Consensus on the Norwegian
Welfare State Model
TRYGVE GULBRANDSEN AND FREDRIK ENGELSTAD
Institute for Social Research, Oslo
ABSTRACT Is the Norwegian welfare state model under pressure? In this article we
argue that this model will persist to the extent that there is a relatively strong consensus
among the majority of the national elites to support it. The empirical results presented
indicate that the majority of the Norwegian elites at the time of the study (2000)
supported the basic institutions and policies in the model and the political compromises
upon which they are based. They express strong support for the system of centralised
wage settlements, a main element in the industrial relations system. They rally behind
continued economic transfers to the rural areas. A majority (albeit small) of the elite
groups prefers to uphold the present state model of production and distribution of
welfare services. There are, however, diﬀerences between the various elite groups as to
how they view the welfare state model. While the members of the private business elite
express preference for basic changes, the mass media elite, the academic elite and the
church leaders are clearly in favour of the present model. The opinions of the individual
leaders are particularly related to the elite groups to which they belong. Social and
educational background has much less eﬀect upon their attitudes.
Introduction
Since the early 1990s the Scandinavian welfare state model has been under
attack, and particularly so the Swedish version of the model. Due to its oil
revenues, prospects for the Norwegian welfare state have been regarded as
brighter than those of its Swedish neighbour. Nevertheless, there are signs
that the Norwegian version may face a diﬃcult future as well. Changes
which have taken place during the last decades have limited the ﬁeld of
political action in decisive ways, as pointed out by the Power and
Democracy Study (Østerud et al. 2003). The most important of these are
changes connected to internationalisation: international agreements –
above all the EEA agreement – restrict the scope of action of public
authorities. Increasing mobility of capital across borders has forced national
authorities to pay more heed to the international ﬁnance market while at the
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 same time the market is increasingly seen as a legitimate and eﬀective
mechanism for governing and regulating public as well as private activities.
These changes obviously pose great challenges to the model, but they do
not have as a necessary consequence that the Norwegian welfare state
system is abolished. An in-depth analysis of the relationship between
economic performance and the welfare state indicates that the most
important threats to the welfare state do not stem from internationalisation
per se. Rather, they come from within, from protests against signiﬁcant
elements of the system, for instance against the relatively egalitarian income
structure (Barth et al. 2003).
Against this background we discuss the degree of support from the
national elites for the continuance of the model. Our basic assumption is
that this model will persist to the extent that there is a relatively strong
consensus among the majority of the national elites to support it, combined
with a relatively small social distance between the elites and the population
at large.
Elites in Democratic Societies
Classical elite theory developed from a general distrust of democracy
(Mosca, Pareto), and of the possibility to maintain democratic institu-
tions (Michels). Mills (1956) supplemented the classical elite theory by
conceiving public and private elites as converging into a single ruling group
in society.
Classical elite theories are not quite relevant for the description of a
Western democracy such as Norway (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002). Elites do
not disappear in democracy, but they acquire a new meaning. In recent
elite theory (Lijphart 1969a, 1969b; Presthus 1973; Putnam 1976;
Higley and Burton 1989) elites are described as institutionally distinct,
socially disparate and politically diverse groups of national leaders.
Mutual accommodation, compromises and consensus between these elite
groups are seen as preconditions for the continuance and stability of
democracies.
In our analysis, using the same framework, elites are deﬁned as the
holders of top positions in central institutions and organisations within
signiﬁcant sectors of the Norwegian society, for instance the political
system, the economy and cultural life. As holders of leadership positions
these elites act as representatives of the interests and concerns embodied in
the particular institutions or organisations. They have been delegated power
to act on behalf of the principals of the individual institutions, to whom they
are responsible. Members of parliament are, for instance, responsible to the
voters, senior civil servants to the elected politicians, union leaders to the
union members, and private business leaders to the shareholders. Through
processes of selection and socialisation the institutions and their principals
ensure that the persons entering the top leadership positions are familiar




































 with and have internalised the values and interests which the institutions are
embodying.
Because the institutions stand for diﬀerent concerns and interests, the
various elite groups are prevented from automatically converging into a
single ruling group. As observed already by Putnam (1976), much of the
variation in outlook within modern elites is related to role diﬀerences. A
national elite is constituted to the degree that sector elites are united,
holding common interests and similar world views. However, this is not a
suﬃcient condition for the constitution of a ‘power elite’ as envisaged by
Mills (1956), as this also included an isolation of the elite from the general
population.
The Norwegian welfare state model rests on a consensus grown out of
previous class compromises, and compromises between opposing interest
groups. The compromises were forged between the leaders of the various
class and interest organisations or movements. In that sense, and in
accordance with modern elite theories, these compromises were elite
compromises.
The basic structure of Norwegian elite compromises has been brought out
as a series of secondary, sector-speciﬁc compromises based on the primary
compromise connected to the establishment of democratic governance
(Engelstad et al. 1999). Throughout Norwegian history these sector-speciﬁc
compromises may be found in such diﬀerent spheres as working life, the
relationship between centre and periphery, foreign policy, gender relations,
the relationship between the state church and low church congregations
(Gulbrandsen et al. 2002).
If elites are deﬁned on the basis of social sectors, it may be argued that
they are mainly powerless, as they only react to the demands and
constraints of their given positions. However, in societies undergoing
continuous change, actions of the top power-holders do make a
diﬀerence. Not only do they aﬀect the direction of their own institutions,
they also may impinge upon the operations of other institutions and
organisations. Even if their power is to some extent circumscribed by
various mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning their behaviour, the
elites nonetheless enjoy substantial room for manoeuvre. Hence, decisions
and actions by elites may have signiﬁcant consequences for social
development.
At the same time, elites in a modern democracy are not acting
unconstrained by what is going on in other parts of society. In fact, there
are several interdependencies between the various institutions. The
institutional fabric of society bears resemblance to an ecological system:
the promotion of particular institutional interests may depend upon the
functioning of the other institutions. Private business, for instance, is highly
dependent upon a large number of collective goods provided by the political
system. To some extent the elites have to develop and shoulder res-
ponsibility for the general system of institutions as well. As a result, their




































 actions may be more concerted than their immediate institutional interests
and values would seem to imply.
The signiﬁcance of the elites’ attitudes to the continuance of the
Norwegian model, and their ability to strike stable compromises, depends
not only on their internal relationship, but also on the relationship between
elites and the population at large. If the elites attempt to preserve or change
the model independently of the opinions of the citizens, it may create mass-
level reactions which may curtail or abort the actions of the elites. Relatively
open processes of recruitment to the elites may bring the attitudes and
opinions of the elites more in line with those of the population.
The elites’ commitment to the Norwegian welfare state model and the
historical compromises upon which it is founded must also be considered in
the context of the overall elite structure, particularly the composition of the
set of dominating elites. Throughout the twentieth century there have been
signiﬁcant changes in this aspect of the Norwegian elite structure. This point
is illustrated in a Norwegian elite study from the late 1960s (Higley et al.
1975). This study restricted itself to four elite groups – the business elite,
civil servants, politicians, and labour union leaders. With the enormous
expansion of the media, cultural life, and research and university sector in
the last decades, the set of dominant elites has become much broader. This
also aﬀects the power structure, putting increased weight on argumentation
and ability of mass persuasion. Hence, the formation of a majority of elite
groups supporting the Norwegian model will also depend upon the opinions
of these ‘new’ elite groups.
Mechanisms Affecting Elite Support for the Norwegian Model
In order to investigate the elites’ attitudes to the Norwegian model we focus
on three areas where the present policies are the result of a series of
historical elite compromises: (a) economic regulation, redistribution and
welfare production by the state, (b) the relation between centre and
periphery, i.e. the rural districts, and (c) industrial relations. As is made clear
in the introductory article to this issue, these are signiﬁcant aspects of the
Norwegian model.
Elite support for the Norwegian model is not primarily a question of the
average level of support, but of the distribution of support among diﬀerent
groups. We will therefore compare the attitudes of 12 diﬀerent elite groups,
all of them representing important institutions and sectors in Norwegian
society. This comparison will enable us to identify what we may describe as
alliances in favour of or against the three sets of policies.
The attitudes of the various elite groups towards the Norwegian welfare
state model are, however, aggregations of the opinions of the individual
members within each elite group. We will also discuss and empirically
examine circumstances and mechanisms which inﬂuence the views of the
individual top leaders. Signiﬁcant changes in these circumstances may




































 produce a sway of opinion among the members of a particular group such
that the group as a whole changes its evaluation of the Norwegian model.
We will focus upon four such mechanisms which foster or weaken individual
elite members’ support for the basic compromises in Norwegian society.
In addition to elite position connected to sector, we focus upon class
background, contact with representatives of other elite groups, and
international contacts.
Elite Position and Sector
In general, we hypothesise that the degree of adherence to the Norwegian
model is inﬂuenced by professional outlook, routines and interests (Putnam
1976). From the deﬁnition of elites given above, it follows that sector
membership has similar diﬀerentiating eﬀects. To give a simple example,
social security to the businessman is an unwanted expenditure that he may
wish to avoid; to the politician, voting for social policies is a precondition
for being re-elected. However, to the degree that the Norwegian model has
developed through a series of elite compromises, these diﬀerences are
expected to be moderate.
Class Background
Historically, welfare state policies have raised the standard of living of the
lower class and reduced income inequalities. Hence, it is expected that top
leaders whose origins lie in working class and middle classes families
particularly appreciate the Norwegian welfare state model. Members of the
upper and upper middle classes also have beneﬁted from the development of
the welfare state, for instance in the form of high quality public health
service, free education, and protection of the environment. The variations as
to ideological views between top leaders from diﬀerent classes are therefore
probably moderate.
Participation in the Corporatist System of Political Decision-Making
Several scholars have suggested that corporatist arrangements may
contribute to a national consensus between groups with opposing interests
(Katzenstein 1985; Woldendorp 1995; Siaroﬀ 1999; O¨berg 2002). By
participating in public committees and boards they learn to appreciate the
functions and operations of the state and become less inclined to react on
the basis of ideological standpoints. Moreover, corporatist arrangements
bring members of diﬀerent elite groups into personal contact with each
other, thereby fostering a mutual understanding of each others’ beliefs. On
the other hand, those who do participate in public committees do so as
representatives of interest groups, something that weakens the assumed
eﬀects.






































As Norway is a small country with an open economy, top leaders in Norway
have to be active on the international scene – in economic as well as in
political relations. On average they spend ten per cent of their working
hours in contact with organisations and individuals in other countries
(Gulbrandsen et al. 2002). As members of international elite networks they
are unavoidably exposed to values, norms and ideas which predominate in
these networks and which, to a large extent, stand in contrast to the
Scandinavian mode of thinking. But international contacts may also
heighten the awareness of national interests and concomitantly move some
to a stronger support of the particular institutions of the Norwegian society.
Data and Variables
Data on Norwegian elites were collected through a large and unique survey
study of Norwegian economic, political and social elites, the Norwegian
Leadership Study, which was carried out in the year 2000.1 The gross sample
of 1,969 persons was established by the ‘position method’. It included all
persons in top positions in the 12 sectors outlined below. Data were
collected through personal interviews with 1,710 of the leaders, giving a
response rate of 87.3 per cent.
The Leadership Study is partly comparable to a Norwegian elite study
carried out in the late 1960s (Higley et al. 1976). This study had a smaller
sample and was restricted to four elite categories: business leaders, top civil
servants, politicians and trade union leaders.
The three variables measuring support for the Norwegian model are
constructed as follows. The attitudes of top leaders towards the traditional
welfare state were measured by their opinions regarding (i) privatisation of
public services, (ii) further development of the public sector vs. reduced
taxes, and (iii) state intervention in private business.2
Evaluation of the centre/periphery dimension in Norwegian politics is
examined by asking whether the leaders agree with the following statement:
(i) ‘The investments in road-building, bridges and tunnels in the local areas
should be reduced’, and through the following question: (ii) ‘How important
is it to maintain the level of economic transfers to the local areas in the years
ahead? Is it very important, somewhat important, of little importance, or
not important at all?’3
To measure attitudes towards the system of centralised wage determination
the leaders were asked the question: ‘In your opinion, how important is it to
Norway to continue the centralised wage settlements in the years to come?’
The central independent variables include the following:
. The groups of leaders, the sector membership, comprise the top positions
in 12 sectors: (1) politicians, (2) state bureaucracy, (3) culture, (4) mass




































 media, (5) private business, (6) the cooperative sector, (7) public business
enterprises, (8) voluntary organisations, (9) universities and research
institutes, (10) the legal system and the police, (11) the military, and (12)
the church.
. Class of origin is constructed on the basis of information about the
father’s occupation, or mother’s occupation where there is no informa-
tion about the father.4 The class variable has three categories: (1) upper
and upper middle classes, (2) middle class, and (3) working class.
. Participation in the corporatist system is measured in two ways. Firstly,
we registered whether the leaders had been members of a public board or
committee during the previous ﬁve-year period. Secondly, they answered
a question about how frequently they had contact during the last year
with members of a large set of other elite groups.5
. The top leaders’ international contact is also measured in two ways. They
were asked how much of their working time (percentage) is spent on
contact with persons or organisations in other countries. Secondly they
reported the two geographical areas of the world with which they have
most contact.6
. In addition, three control variables are included: gender, age, which is a
continuous variable, and level of education, which has eight values and is
likewise treated as a continuous variable.
We start the analysis by establishing the social distance between the elites
and the population at large. The next step is to describe the variation
between sectors/elite groups in support of the Norwegian model. We then
commence to examine the individual elite members’ attitudes. In three
regression (OLS) models we investigate the eﬀects of the four independent
variables and the three control variables. International comparisons are
made when available data make it possible.
Class Origin and Degree of Social Isolation of Norwegian Elites
To what degree may the Norwegian elites be regarded as isolated from the
population? The ﬁrst two columns in Table 1 show the class of origin of the
elite groups as a whole, and of the population in the same age groups, in
2001. The data show a recruitment pattern that is fairly open, but far from
egalitarian. Whereas 58 per cent of the population have their origins in the
working class/lower class, only 22 per cent among the elites have this social
background. At the same time, 37 per cent of the elites have their
background in the upper and upper middle classes compared to 10 per cent
of the population. Concerning social background, Norwegian elites have
quite good contacts with people far from their own positions.
An indication of the extent to which there has been an opening of elite
positions is given in the remaining columns of Table 1, where elite
recruitment in 2001 is compared to that of 1967. The comparison is limited
























































































































































































































































































































































































































 to those groups which were studied in both years. While as much as 92 per
cent of the business elite in 1967 had elite or upper middle class
backgrounds, only 42 per cent had fathers who belonged to the upper class
and upper middle class in 2000. Signiﬁcant decreases in the recruitment of
elite members from the higher social strata of society appear among civil
servants and politicians as well.
The comparison with 1967 should be treated with caution, as both
sampling procedures and conceptualisation of social class diﬀered in the two
studies.7 However, despite these sources of error, the results of the
comparison are robust and quite striking.
Thus, there can be no doubt that recruitment to traditional elite groups
has become more open during the last decades of the twentieth century. The
‘new’ elites in 2001 which gained importance in the same period, i.e. those
ﬁlling top positions in the media, research and cultural life, have a social
background which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to that shown for civil
servants in 2001. They are all within the range of 2–3 percentage points
from the group average of the total 2001 sample (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002,
Table 4.1).
Available data from international comparisons indicate that the present
pattern of elite recruitment in Norway is fairly typical in Northern Europe.
As in Norway, the members of the political elite in Denmark, Sweden and
Germany are more frequently recruited from the lower middle classes than
the other elite groups (SOU 1990: 322; Schnapp 1997: 82; Christiansen et al.
2001: 217). In Finland, however, politicians are somewhat more often
recruited from the upper and upper middle classes (Ruostersaari 1993: 315).
In all countries private business leaders have on average a relatively
privileged background. However, a higher percentage of business leaders in
Norway and Finland come from families belonging to the upper or upper
middle class than do the business leaders in Denmark and Sweden. Top
leaders in the public administration in Germany are more frequently
recruited from privileged classes than in the Nordic countries (Schnapp
1997: 82).
The degree of social isolation from the population may also be measured
by diﬀerences in opinion. In general, the Norwegian population is in favour
of government intervention to make incomes more equal and to guarantee
living conditions (Listhaug and Aalberg 1999), more so than the elite. The
elites do not, however, deviate much from the rest of the population.
Previous analyses of the Leadership Study show that Norwegian elites are
somewhat less concerned about reducing income inequalities, but more
committed to equal opportunities for women and minority groups. The elite
possess important similarities with the citizens in other respects as well. For
instance, the percentage of members of the Norwegian elite who voted
socialist in the 1997 parliamentary election is about the same as in the
population as a whole. Moreover, the elite members are distributed along
the same political cleavages as the citizens (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002).





































Support for the Norwegian Model among Sector Elites
We commence the analysis of elite support for the Norwegian model by
presenting average mean scores of each sector elite group on the three
indices. Figure 1 combines answers concerning the private/public and the
centre/periphery issues. Along both axes the midpoint value is 2.5, indicat-
ing moderate support.
Figure 1 shows, ﬁrstly, that along the private/public dimension (the x-
axis) the majority of the elite groups are clustered around the midpoint
value. Six of the groups are located left of this value. They show moderate
support for the welfare state model. Politicians, leaders of institutions within
the culture sector, and church leaders, emerge as the strongest supporters of
the present role and size of the public sector. Among the politicians the
opinions are, however, quite divergent, following the stance of the
individual political parties (cf. Figure 3 below). Five groups are located to
the right of the midpoint value indicating that they counter this model. Four
of these – top leaders in public business enterprises, in the military services,
in enterprises within the cooperative sector and in the mass media – must,
however, be characterised as moderate in their opposition. The exception is
the private business leaders, who distinguish themselves by being clearly in
favour of more privatisation and a halt to public welfare expenditures. The
moderately positive ‘middle group’ consists of top leaders in voluntary
organisations, in the police and the judicial system, senior public oﬃcials
and top leaders in universities and research institutes.
In general, even if market liberalism has gained ground, manifesting itself
in opposition to high taxes among the citizens, scepticism toward state
FIGURE 1
THE ELITE GROUPS’ SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC/PRIVATE AND CENTRE/PERIPHERY
COMPROMISES




































 involvement among top business leaders, and measures for privatisation in
politics, Figure 1 indicates that the support for the new ideological ideas
among the Norwegian elites is still limited.
Secondly, Figure 1 demonstrates a stronger consensus among the
Norwegian elite groups about the desirability of preserving the rural areas
than to continue the state model of governance and welfare production (the
y-axis). Ten of the elite groups are moderately to strongly in favour of
continuing the economic transfers to the rural areas and to continue
developing their infrastructure. We see this ﬁnding as an expression of a
relatively broad support for the national centre/periphery compromises,
stronger than for the private/public compromises. Only two of the 12 groups
have mean values below the midpoint value. Church leaders are the most
positive towards upholding vital rural areas; the private business leaders are
the most negative. Nonetheless, the private business leaders are quite
moderate in their opposition to continued regional development.
Thirdly, Figure 1 reveals clearly that the top leaders’ attitudes towards the
welfare state are relatively closely related to their views about the centre/
periphery compromises. Members of elite groups who are positive towards
the public sector are also active supporters of the interests of the rural areas
(r = 0.39). This applies particularly to the church leaders. At the other end
of the scale we see that top leaders in both private and public business
enterprises favour more privatisation and a reduction in the economic
transfers to rural areas. Higher military oﬃcers break this pattern of similar
location along the two indexes. They support active regional policies, but
are at the same time sceptical of the role and responsibilities of the state.
Elite consensus is even stronger when it comes to aspects of industrial
relations. Figure 2 demonstrates a generally strong backing of the
FIGURE 2
SUPPORT FOR CENTRALISED SYSTEM OF WAGE DETERMINATION (%)




































 Norwegian system of centralised wage determination. Even among private
business leaders, who are the least enthusiastic elite group, 69 per cent
consider it important that Norway continues this way of settling the wages
in the labour market. Leaders in ﬁrms within the cooperative sector and
church leaders are those elite groups who are most positive towards this
main element in the industrial relations system.
Political Cleavages
In order to assess the signiﬁcance of elite consensus and conﬂict, the ﬁndings
depicted in Figure 1 may be contrasted with the distribution among
politicians in the parliament. Figure 3 shows that parliamentary members
who belong to the Socialist People’s Party (SV), the Centre Party (Sp) and
the Labour Party (Ap) are strongly in favour of the present state model,
while members of the Conservative Party (Høyre) and the (right-wing)
Progress Party (FrP) are strongly opposed to state intervention. The
diﬀerences are less concerning the politicians’ views upon policies for
preserving rural areas. It is noticeable that all the parties in the Storting
support subsidies for local areas.
Figure 3 indicates that the Conservative Party and the Progress Party are
the most natural allies for the private business leaders in their resistance to
state intervention and a large public sector. It should be noted that the
members of these two parties actually declare themselves more in opposition
to state intervention than private business leaders. The same is true for
their views on industrial relations, as the Conservative Party and the
Progress Party are more sceptical of centralised wage bargaining and work
FIGURE 3
SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC/PRIVATE AND CENTRE/PERIPHERY COMPROMISES AMONG
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT




































 environment protection than are the business leaders (Gulbrandsen et al.
2002). Hence, manifest political cleavages do not necessarily reﬂect under-
lying conﬂicts among elites.
The two other elite groups which to a certain extent share the opinions of
the private business leaders on state intervention – the elite within the
military services and the top leaders in publicly owned business companies
– are ideologically closer to the members of the Liberal Party (Venstre). Top
leaders within the police and the judiciary, among whom many vote for the
Conservative Party (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002), are quite far removed from
the Conservative Party in their evaluation of the public sector.
International Comparisons
The few international elite studies which are comparable to the Norwegian
study show clear similarities in opinions of various elite groups on
signiﬁcant issues. In a German elite study carried out in 1972 (Hoﬀman-
Lange et al. 1985), politicians from the SPD and CDU/CSU represented the
extreme points in the opinions concerning economic policy and social
policy, whereas the administrative elite fell in the middle between the
political parties, and the private business elite and the military elite stood
close to the CD/CSU on both issues. Top leaders within mass media and
within science and higher education had a position similar to the SPD on
social policies, but were between the political parties on matters of economic
policy. The fact that the political parties hold more extreme positions is
similar to the situation in Norway (see Figure 3).
In a Swedish elite study from the end of the 1980s (SOU 1990; Petersson
et al. 1996) the private business elite distinguished itself from the other elite
groups by giving lower priority to the public sector, equality and the
environment (deﬁned as a red/green dimension) and to immigration,
development aid and social beneﬁts (deﬁned as a welfare dimension).
Politicians and the cultural elite in Sweden were located in at the opposite
end to the private business elite, being preoccupied with red/green issues and
with supporting welfare policies, again similar to our ﬁndings. With
reservations regarding diﬀerent research designs, it seems that the private
business elite in Sweden stands more apart from the other elite groups than
the private business elite in Norway.
Factors Explaining Adherence to the Welfare State
To what extent are the diﬀerences between sector elites attributable to sector
speciﬁcity, and to what extent are they dependent on other factors, such as
internationalisation and participation in the corporative system? Table 2
presents the results of regression analyses of individual elite members’ support
for the three important elements in the Norwegian model. The regression
models include the independent variables discussed above (elite sector, class





































background, participation in the corporatist system, and international
contacts), and the three control variables: gender, education and age.
The most striking ﬁnding in Table 2 is that the opinions of the leaders are
particularly related to which elite group they belong to. This is true for the
two ﬁrst indicators of the Norwegian model. Elite group membership alone
explains for instance as much as 24 per cent of the variation in the top
TABLE 2











Intercept 3.144** (0.257) 3.457 (0.274)** 3.216 (0.303)**
Elite group (reference group:
church leaders):
Leaders in the state
administration
70.146 (0.117) 70.740 (0.124)** 70.378 (0.140)**
Leaders in culture
institutions
70.047 (0.123) 70.650 (0.131)** 70.281 (0.147)
Leaders in mass media 70.347 (0.134)** 70.859 (0.143)** 70.300 (0.159)
Leaders in private business 71.136 (0.114)** 70.980 (0.122)** 70.444 (0.136)**
Leaders in cooperatives 70.489 (0.166)** 70.202 (0.177) 70.133 (0.197)
Leaders in public enterprises 70.705 (0.150)** 71.018 (0.159)** 70.510 (0.177)**
Leaders in interest groups
and voluntary
organizations
70.318 (0.118)** 70.620 (0.126)** 70.394 (0.141)**
Leaders in research institutes
and universities
70.122 (0.118) 70.515 (0.126)** 70.368 (0.141)*
Leaders in police and the
judicial system
70.378 (0.128)** 70.5537 (0.137)** 70.446 (0.153)**
Leaders in the military
services
70.538 (0.138)** 70.364 (0.147)* 70.421 (0.164)*
Politicians 70.054 (0.130) 70.236 (0.139) 70.363 (0.155)*
Class background (ref. category:
upper and upper middle class):
Middle class 0.076 (0.045) 0.040 (0.048) 0.119 (0.053)*
Working class 0.182 (0.054)** 0.058 (0.058) 0.145 (0.064)*
Member of public committee
or board
0.107 (0.044)* 0.009 (0.047) 0.048 (0.052)
Frequency of contact with
other elite groups (aver.)
70.061 (0.048) 0.039 (0.052) 0.035 (0.057)





Area of contact (dummy
variables):
The Nordic Countries 0.056 (0.057) 0.006 (0.061) 70.014 (0.068)
West Europe 70.122 (0.046)** 70.134 (0.049)** 70.086 (0.054)
USA and Canada 70.100 (0.064) 70.052 (0.068) 70.189 (0.075)*
Africa 0.297 (0.120)* 0.053 (0.127) 0.197 (0.141)
Controlled for age, gender
and education
Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.30 0.15 0.05
N 1397 1395 1388
Regression analyses (Ols).
Standard deviations in parentheses.




































 leaders’ attitudes towards the role and responsibilities of the state, while
explained variance increases by only six percentage points when the other
independent variables are added. The increase in R2 is even more modest in
the second model (the leaders’ views on economic transfers to the rural
areas) – as little as one per cent. However, and somewhat surprisingly,
‘sector’ explains just one per cent of the variation in the leaders’ attitudes
towards centralised wage determination, while the remaining variables
explain four per cent. This last ﬁnding reﬂects much stronger agreement
among the various elite groups in their evaluation of this element of the
Norwegian model.
Table 2 indicates, secondly, that top leaders’ class origin has some, albeit
relatively weak, eﬀect on how they view the Norwegian model. Top leaders
with working class background show greater approval of the welfare state
model. Together with leaders from middle class backgrounds they also show
greater support for the system of centralised wage settlement than leaders
with a background in the upper or the or upper middle class. Class origin
does not seem to have any eﬀect upon their opinions on policies for
preserving the rural areas.
Third, the ﬁrst column in Table 2 conﬁrms that top leaders who have been
members of a public committee or board during the previous ﬁve years are
more in favour of a continued active state than leaders without this
experience. This variable did not aﬀect their attitudes toward the centre/
periphery issue and centralised wage determination. Frequency of contact
with representatives of other elite groups had no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Finally, Table 2 indicates signiﬁcant, although weak eﬀects of inter-
nationalisation. The amount of time spent on contact with organisations or
persons in other countries has impact only upon their evaluation of centre/
periphery compromises. International relations seem to instil a stronger
central orientation among members of the Norwegian elite groups.
Moreover, the areas of the world with which they have contact are also
signiﬁcantly related to their beliefs. Top leaders who have much contact
with persons and organisations in Western Europe (outside the Nordic
countries) endorse more privatisation, a halt in public welfare expenditures
and a curtailment of state inﬂuence in private business (Model 1); and they
are signiﬁcantly less enthusiastic about continuing the economic transfers to
the rural areas (Model 2). Top leaders with relations mainly to the USA and
Canada are more negative to the centralised system of wage determination
than leaders without relations to these countries (Model 3). But there is also
a reverse eﬀect of internationalisation. Among the few top leaders with main
contacts with Africa, there is more concern with continuing the present
welfare state model.
The result from the regression analysis is that ‘sector’ is by far is the most
inﬂuential factor on social and political views. This implies that the elites in
a modern society are ﬁrst and foremost ‘agents’ or representatives of speciﬁc
institutions. The ﬁndings from the German and Swedish elite studies




































 support the same interpretation for these countries as well. As discussed
above, the elites have been delegated authority by citizens, shareholders, or
members to make decisions on their behalf which may enhance their welfare
or meet their interests, and to see to the fulﬁlment of the basic purpose of the
individual elite institution. Top leaders have power, but they must use their
power in accordance with the speciﬁc institutional concerns, demands and
norms. Understanding and explaining their attitudes and behaviour requires
understanding of the institutions they represent.
Discussion
Inﬂuence from international trends, as well as substantive changes in
politics and the economy inevitably bring forth social change. But is it a
question of drastic change or more modest adjustment? Our results indicate
that the majority of the Norwegian elites still support the basic institutions
and policies in the Norwegian welfare state model and the political
compromises upon which they are based (at least in the year 2000).
They express strong support for the system of centralised wage settlements,
a main element in the industrial relations system. They rally behind
continued economic transfers to the districts. A majority (albeit small) of the
elite groups prefers to uphold the present state model of production and
distribution of welfare services.
Is this pattern of elite support speciﬁc to the Norwegian case, or is it
similar to the situation in the other North European welfare states? The few
available studies in Sweden and Germany (including Bu¨rklin, Rebenstorf
u.a. 1997) indicate that also in these countries a majority of the national elite
groups are in favour of the present welfare state model. As top leaders of
the institutions which constitute the fabric of this model, many of the elites
have become caretakers and defenders of the model. This fact is conducive
to a certain institutional inertia in the whole system. This state of aﬀairs
probably bolsters the welfare state model.
The wide range of attitudes of the political parties in parliament and their
location towards the extremes, particularly on the index representing the
private/public cleavage, is in accordance with ‘the directional theory’ of
voting (Rabinowitz and McDonald 1989). According to this theory, the
electorate will vote for that political party which most clearly shows them
the direction in issues of particular importance to them. As a result of this
role of political ‘guides’, the political parties take more extreme positions
than the voters, including members of the other elite groups.
Above we pointed out that the elite structure in the Norwegian society has
changed through the inclusion of ‘new’ elite groups. We particularly
emphasised the mass media and the academic elites. Both of these elite
groups turn out to be pronounced supporters of the Norwegian model.
Thus, the change of the elite structure through the emergence of new elite
groups has implied a fortiﬁcation of the alliance behind this model.




































 Moreover, the mass media and the academic elite have been accompanied
by the church leaders. During recent decades a change of mentality seems to
have taken place within the church. Once a rather politically conservative
group, i.e. belonging to the right wing of the political landscape, the church
elite has become virtually a spearhead in the support for the welfare state
and the rural districts.
When we consider the three dimensions of the Norwegian model together,
it appears as if the private business elite stands relatively alone in their
preference for signiﬁcant changes in this model against the rest of the elite
groups. Business leaders are strongly in favour of reducing taxes,
downsizing the public sector and curtailing state inﬂuence upon private
business. They believe that the redistribution of income in Norwegian
society has been taken far enough, and that it is time to reconsider incomes
policy and regional policy. Even if a majority of those in our study expressed
a will to continue the centralised of wage settlements, the Norwegian
Confederation of Industry and Trade has recently decided to go for a more
decentralised system.
Hence, the most important source of a push for change in the Norwegian
welfare state model is found among the private business elite and political
parties sympathising with their position. Admittedly, private business
leaders represent a minority within the Norwegian elite, but they have
considerable power. One basis of their power is the possible threat to
eliminate jobs through shutting down or downsizing production or moving
to other regions and countries (Lindblom 1977). They also have consider-
able argumentative power, and actively use it to inﬂuence the outcome of
political decisions. Employer and private business organisations, as well as
individual top leaders, are among the most active lobbyists in the
Norwegian political system. In total, all these lobby activities amount to a
signiﬁcant pressure upon the political decisions-makers in Norway
(Gulbrandsen et al. 2002).
This description of the private business elite as the most important ‘agent
for change’ in Norwegian society needs to be moderated. Firstly, as shown
above, the members of this elite group strongly approve of the Norwegian
system of industrial relations. In fact, they are less worried about any
negative eﬀects of this system than many right-wing politicians. They have a
relatively strong trust in the main political and social institutions of the
society, on a par with the other elite groups, testimony to a signiﬁcant
adherence to the institutional basis of Norwegian society (Engelstad et al.
2003). Moreover, in the 1997 parliamentary election about 20 per cent of
business leaders voted for a socialist party, indicating that independent of
their general ideological beliefs they may be pragmatic in action
(Gulbrandsen 2005).
Even though the business elite has considerable power within their own
half of the ﬁeld – to decide about investments and location of production –
their power is limited in signiﬁcant ways. One important limitation is due to




































 collective action problems. Modern Norwegian history is full of examples of
business leaders who on the one hand have ideologically and politically
combated state interventions, but on the other have actively lobbied for
public subsidies or regulations giving themselves favourable market
conditions or protection. Business leaders basically seem to be characterised
by a ‘both-and’ orientation. They want the best out of the state, while
simultaneously advocating a liberal market model of political governance.
Moreover, the power of the business elite is limited by their position vis-a`-
vis the other elite groups. In many respects their views and preoccupations
have been shown to be fairly remote from those of other elites. With the
exception of conservative politicians, they have hardly any natural allies in
the other elite groups.
Are there any ‘countervailing powers’ or mechanisms which work to the
advantage of the present welfare state model? The present model is
particularly defended by those elite groups which manage ideas and general
values, i.e. church leaders and the top leaders within the academic, mass
media and culture sectors. The future of the Norwegian model may then
depend upon the willingness and ability of the members of these groups to
develop and disseminate alternative ideological ideas and arguments in
favour of the model.
Likewise, civil servants in the state bureaucracy and the judicial elite
(judges and top leaders within the police) both support the main elements of
the Norwegian model. At the same time, members of the judicial elite have
the most privileged social background of all elite groups. Civil servants, as
well, are frequently recruited from the upper class and the upper middle
class. It might seem a paradox that these privileged groups nonetheless take
their stand behind the Norwegian model. One possible explanation is that as
public sector employees they are personally highly dependent upon the
continuance of this model. In our opinion, this ﬁnding can be better
explained by examining the basic values and culture of the institution to
which these elite groups belong, the state civil service.
In the second half of the nineteenth century the Norwegian state, in spite
of a liberal orientation, had to step in to safeguard the emerging industries,
investing heavily in the infrastructure and assisting the establishment of a
national banking system. In this manner the state became a ‘senior partner’
to private business. This fact is evidence of the historical role of the civil
servants as managers and overseers of the collective interests of the emerging
nation. In many ways the state bureaucracy and its top leaders became a
pillar in society, creators and stewards of the basic institutions in the new
nation. This role and the ensuing obligations created an ethos of moderation
and loyalty to the constitution, which is still alive.
A characteristic of the system of political decision-making in Norway,
as in the other Scandinavian countries, is that signiﬁcant interest groups
are involved in preparing and implementing political decisions. They are
frequently consulted before ﬁnal decisions are made, and they act as




































 members of numerous public bodies. To a large extent, this corporatist
system emerged as a response to the serious class conﬂicts during the ﬁrst
decades of the twentieth century. Our ﬁndings indicate that an indirect
eﬀect of this system is to increase the support for the present welfare
state model.
Coping with the challenges to the Norwegian model is, of course, not
conﬁned to the elites alone. The future of the model depends equally upon
the attitudes and reactions at the mass level. Citizens may put pressure on
the elites to continue the present level of the welfare state, or they may
favour fundamental changes. Available data, referred to above, testify a
strong popular adherence to the welfare state based on public services. A
crucial question is to what extent elites reﬂect the preferences in the
population.
We have shown that a democratisation of elite recruitment has taken
place over the last generation. Even though the recruitment pattern is far
from egalitarian, this has obvious consequences for the adherence of the
elites to the Norwegian model. To some degree, top leaders of lower social
origin are more supportive of central elements in the Norwegian model than
elite persons from the upper and upper middle classes. The eﬀect is,
however, fairly weak, something which implies that increased openness will
have modest consequences. Equalisation of chances to reach elite positions
is a good thing in itself, but more for reasons of democracy than for the
defence of the welfare state.
Our diagnosis is that in the immediate future the elites will not attempt to
push the population to accept signiﬁcant changes in the Norwegian model.
To the extent that this model encounters serious diﬃculties, the challenges
lie in coping with collective action problems and problems of governance,
rather than in diﬀerences in values and preferences between citizens and the
majority of the elites.
Notes
1. This study is an important part of the Power and Democracy Project, a ﬁve year project
commissioned by the Norwegian parliament. The Leadership Study was conducted by the
Institute for Social Research in collaboration with Statistics Norway.
2. On the basis of the replies we constructed an index with values from 1 to 4, where 4 indicates
little support for the present ‘welfare state model’; the value 1 indicates very strong support.
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81.
3. On the basis of the replies an index was constructed in the same way as the private/public
index with four values. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.61.
4. The construction of this variable is described in detail in Gulbrandsen et al. (2002).
5. The groups were: (1) members of parliament, (2) members of the cabinet, (3) leaders of the
political parties, (4) top leaders of the ministries, directorates and inspectorates, (5) leaders in
private enterprises and ﬁnance institutions, (6) leaders in public enterprises and ﬁnance
institutions, (7) leaders of national trade unions, (8) leaders of employer and trade
associations, (9) national leaders of voluntary and civic organisations, (10) leaders of
universities, colleges and research institutes, (11) church leaders, (12) leaders within the




































 police and the judicial system, (13) top oﬃcers in the military services, and (14) editors and
senior commentators in the mass media. The questions about contact with members of the
Storting and the cabinet were not presented to permanent secretaries, general directors,
ambassadors, members of the Storting or secretaries of state, and the alternative replies were
weekly, monthly, less frequently, or never.
6. Seventy-seven per cent of the leaders reported that most of their contact was with the Nordic
countries, 68 per cent replied Western Europe, 17 per cent USA and Canada, and only 3 per
cent had most of their contact with persons and organisations in Africa.
7. First, a smaller sample size in the 1967 data may imply a somewhat greater concentration of
persons with elite background. Secondly, while the Leadership Study 2000 used survey
questions to collect information about the social background of the elites, Higley, Field and
Grøholt (1976) availed themselves of standard sources of data such as Who’s Who,
handbooks of various occupational and professional groups and yearbooks of university
student cohorts. Third, even though the class variable has nearly identical labels in the two
data sets, the underlying classiﬁcation of occupation is not identical. In the study by Higley,
Field and Grøholt (1976) the business elite sample consisted of 325 persons who held
directorships and executive positions in the 122 largest private companies and the six most
central business organisations and about whom relatively uniform data were available. In the
2000 study the business elite consisted of the CEO or president and the chairman of the
board of all private companies with at least 400 employees (238 companies), and the vice-
presidents in enterprises with more than 4,000 employees (24 companies). The political elite
in the 1967 study consisted of the 79 persons who held cabinet or under-secretary positions
and the 97 persons who sat on the national executive committees of the ﬁve political parties.
In contrast, the sample of political leaders in the 2000 study consisted of members of
parliament, cabinet members and their under-secretaries, leaders of the political parties and
the mayors in the ten largest cities in Norway. Even if the 1967 study did not speciﬁcally
select members of the Storting it still covered this group of politicians indirectly because most
of the persons in their sample had high parliamentary positions throughout most of the
1960s. The sample of the civil service elite in the 1967 study was put together in a very similar
manner to that in the Leadership Study 2000.
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